Supremacy Clause v. Iran Deal

Does the Iran deal, currently being considered by Congress, conflict with the 1970 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty which was approved by the US Senate? Some say it does (see, for example, the following articles: ; ). If so, then our President’s deal would be in conflict with the “supremacy clause” of Article VI of the US Constitution which says the following: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”. In other words, a mere executive order or agreement cannot constitutionally supersede an established treaty. A discussion of the merits of the deal itself is beyond the scope of this website. I have no psychiatric training to understand why our negotiators would agree to a deal which gives nearly everything they want to an avowed enemy. The Iranians are ranting in the streets “Death to America”, they are holding our hostages, they are vehemently threatening our allies, and yet we are giving them billions of dollars to further cause death and destruction in the region and a clear path (albeit after a few more years) to a nuclear bomb. . . . . Iran_deal

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VL Petition to Sign

Petition our readers may want to sign,

“Chief Justice of Judicial Council,: Abolish the vexatious litigant statute in family law cases in California..”

Here’s the link:

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[Originally published May 21, 2014]

[Please note: A copy of this message (with some personal information redacted) will be posted on the administrator’s blog at – along with responses, if any]


Mr. Darrell Mahood
Director, Jury Services
Los Angeles County Superior Court
(213) 974-5814

May 21, 2014

Re: Summons for Jury Service (set for June 16, 2014)
JID __________

I respectfully request to be excused from jury duty June 16, 2014, for the following reasons:   Continue reading

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Kozinski-itis: Hypocrisy in the Unpublished Opinions Controversy

Judges ought to be more learned than witty, . . Francis Bacon

These two messages comprised an article in Citizens Law Journal (2004)]

The 9th Circuit’s non-publication rule (Circuit Rule 36-3) undermines the Doctrine of Precedent – the very foundation of Anglo-American law. In a published case, Judge Alex Kozinski ruled it constitutional – assuring the public not to worry about its being abused. Yet he, himself, abused the rule in two unpublished cases. A rule he sets forth as law in one opinion is completely contradicted by his own ruling in another, nearly identical, case (article revised 2-9-04).

A disturbing trend among federal appellate courts is to promulgate rules which allow selective publication of opinions and provide that the unpublished opinions do not constitute binding precedent and may not even be cited in unrelated cases. In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals such a non-publication/no-citation rule is Circuit Rule 36-3. Continue reading

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About the Word “Vexatious”

[First published November 26, 2013 –  1393 views until now]

About the word “Vexatious”

In general usage, the word “vexatious” means blameworthy

English language dictionaries define “vexatious” conduct as conduct that is blameworthy. “Vexatious”, in general usage, refers to someone who does something blameworthy – someone who deliberately harasses or annoys someone else. Dictionary definitions of “vexatious” are the following: “. . . lacking justification and intended to harass . . .” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 2002, S.v., “vexatious”) – “. . . Of legal actions: Instituted without sufficient grounds for the purpose of causing trouble or annoyance to the defendant.” (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1973, S.v., “vexatious”). Continue reading

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Pierce v. Cantil-Sakauye class action Opening Brief filed 11-08-2013

[First published Nov.15, 2013 – 493 views until now]

Pierce v. Cantil-Sakauye class action Opening Brief filed 11-08-2013

“Arch Cunningham, the attorney representing the class of parents who were stigmatized as vexatious, has filed his opening brief with the Ninth District Circuit Court of Appeal. The brief specifically addresses the unconstitutionality of the vexatious litigant application in family law and how parents have been maliciously harmed by not having the first and fourteenth substantive and procedural due process right to seek redress from terminating custody orders. The brief in its entirety can be accessed here. Continue reading

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California Traffic Camera Tickets: Robotic Law Enforcement

[First published 29 Aug 2013]

Below is part of a recent response to a California Camera Ticket.

I thought this may be of interest to others.  Does anyone know if this issue of the Jackson case is the same issue as that of the class action suit brought by an attorney named Robert D. Conaway in Barstow, California? Continue reading

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How Vague is “Frivolous”? – Part 2

[First published Mar 25, 2014 – republished Dec 8, 2014 after 466 views]

Under sec. 391(b)(3) of California’s so-called “Vexatious Litigant” statute (California Civil Procedure Code Sec.391 et seq – “VLS”) a pro se litigant may be punished for engaging in what is described therein as “tactics that are frivolous”. A previous blog post, How Vague is “Frivolous” – Part 1, described how a well-meaning pre-trial “inquisitorial motion” became the basis, inter alia, for an order declaring a layman, in propria persona, to be a “vexatious litigant” under Sec. 391(b)(3). The inquisitorial motion was intended to reduce all parties’ expenses – the very opposite of “harassment” as contemplated by the VLS. In that case, the stigmatization of the petitioner as a “vexatious litigant” exemplifies abuse of the VLS. The VLS is susceptible to abuse because it is inherently vague and indefinite. A civil statute which is too indefinite to enforce is invalid. See Seaboard Acc.Corp. v. Shay (1931) 214 Cal.361.

The question here is whether CCP sec. 391(b)(3) is constitutionally void for vagueness – particularly because it is directed to the non-lawyer, someone who has no opportunity to know the difference between litigation tactics that a judge may consider “frivolous” or “not frivolous”? Continue reading

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Prior Restraint Errors in Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo – Part 2

[First published Oct. 31, 2013 – 233 views until now]

Judge Morrison’s Error # 4 – A “Partial Restriction” is still a “prior restraint”

Judge Morrison holds that what he describes as a “partial restriction” does not constitute a prior restraint.

“Wolfgram has not established that a partial restriction on the ability to file suit has ever been held to be a “prior restraint” requiring a showing of clear and present danger and concomitant procedural safeguards. . . . To the extent it keeps vexatious litigants from clogging courts, it is closer to “licensing or permit systems which are administered pursuant to narrowly draw, reasonable and definite standards” which represent “government’s only practical means of managing competing uses of public facilities[.]”  . . . When a vexatious litigant knocks on the courthouse door with a colorable claim, he may enter.”.

However, Smith v. Silvey 149 Cal.App.3d 400 (1983) determined that a particular injunction against filing — which was only “partial” — was nevertheless determined to be prior restraint. Smith was cited by Judge Morrison but was not factually distinguished. Continue reading

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Prior Restraint Errors in Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo – Part 1

[First published Oct. 31, 2013 – 293 views until now]

Prior Restraint Errors in Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo – Part 1

Wolfgram v Wells Fargo Bank (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 43, is the opinion cited in case after case – often without further analysis – as the chief authority for upholding the constitutionality of California’s so-called “Vexatious Litigant Statute” (California Civil Procedure Code, Sec 391 et seq. – “VLS”). However, the author of the Wolfgram opinion, Judge Fred K. Morrison, unfortunately has made numerous judicial errors in his opinion.

The Wolfgram conclusions are not correct. They are based on fallacious reasoning, stereotypes and unfounded presumptions. These errors require more than one blog post to discuss. In this post, I focus on the errors regarding the issue of prior restraint. Continue reading

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